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As the 1990s begin, social security is once again at the center of public
debate. Under current projections social security is expected to post
substantial surpluses during the next two or three decades and a string
of ever-increasing deficits thereafter. In the meantime the social se
curity trust funds are projected to accumulate large reserves. At the
heart of the current controversy is the question of how politicians will
behave when the trust funds are temporarily flush with cash. Will the
surplus funds actually be saved for future years, or will they be spent
either directly through social security expansion or indirectly through
an expansion of the rest of the budget?
No binding rules on politicians dictate how surplus monies will be
used. Under current law any excess revenues in the trust funds must be
used to purchase new special-issue government bonds, but that does
not reveal what is done with the revenues the Treasury has thus been
lent. Excess social security revenues, like any other federal revenues,
are available to finance the general operations of the government. They
may be used to retire outstanding government debt or to finance an
increase in federal spending or a reduction in federal taxes.
How political discretion determines this fiscal choice is the subject
of this chapter. If tax and spending decisions in the rest of the budget
are independent of social security, then any excess social security rev
enues reduce the federal budget deficit and allow the Treasury to retire
outstanding privately held public debt. If po\iticians respond to the
surplus social security revenues by increasing federal spending (or
reducing federal taxes), then some or all of the surpluses translate into
a higher deficit in the rest of the budget, with little or no reduction in
the overall deficit or national debt.
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The question of how politicians will use the surpluses in the com
ing years cannot be settled by force of conviction or ideals about polit
ical behavior. It is fundamentally an empirical question about the
interrelationship between social security and other fiscal decisions.
This chapter attempts to provide an empirical analysis of several
key fiscal relationships and, in so doing, to inform the debate over the
advance funding of social security. In particular an empirical technique
known as causality testing is used to examine the relationships be
tween social security revenues, trust fund balances, and aggregate fed
eral spending and between social security revenues and other federal
revenues. Some understanding about the actual historical relationships
between these variables can help to make informed judgments about
the likely effects of the social security surpluses.
The remainder of the chapter first reviews previous empirical
studies on the causal relationship between government taxation and
spending, and the importance of testing the dynamic nature of political
responses involving social security. Second, an empirical model is for
mulated and empirical findings evaluated. Finally, results are analyzed
in the context of current policy deliberations.
The Importance of Dynamic Analysis
Almost all solutions to fiscal problems follow from some prescribed
change in spending or taxes under a static, or independent, framework.
Economists have long argued for advance funding of social security
under the assumption that doing so would not trigger behavior by
politicians that would undermine the attainment of the stated goal: an
increase in national saving.
Economic or political behavior is seldom so simple. A dynamic
framework of budgetary behavior-whether in the area of social secur
ity spending or aggregate federal spending-recognizes at least four
possibilities in a world of political discretion: tax decisions are in
fluenced by expenditure decisions, expenditure decisions are influ
enced by tax decisions, expenditure and tax decisions are unrelated, or
expenditure and tax decisions are jointly determined. Static analysis of
dynamic relationships can lead to an incorrect understanding of be
havior and therefore to inappropriate policy recommendations.
Only recently have economists recognized the importance of ana
lyzing fiscal policy in a dynamic framework. Using a common method
of determining causal relationships referred to as Granger causality
testing, more than nine studies have attempted to establish the tax
spend relationship at the federal, state, and local levels of government.
While the results are not totally in agreement, the available studies
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suggest that a dynamic analysis of governmental budget behavior is
appropriate and that in an examination of the historical relationship
between taxes and spending, the hypothesis that expenditures will rise
whenever taxes rise cannot be reasonably rejected, and vice versa.!
In this chapter this dynamic analysis is extended to social security.
Before one can evaluate the likely effects of the trust fund surpluses or
offer appropriate solutions, one must understand the political dy
namics behind social security and other federal revenue and spending
decisions. The interrelationships between the primary policy param
eters-social security revenues, trust fund balances, and aggregate fed
eral spending, as well as between social security revenues and other
federal revenues-are analyzed. The more one understands about the
politics of federal fiscal behavior, the less ambiguous are the effects of
proposed solutions, and the higher is the likelihood that policy goals
are attained.
The Budget Constraint Hypothesis and Social Security
The early research on causality, which was motivated primarily by
political debate on the federal budget, focused on the question, Does a
tax increase unambiguously lower the deficit?2 On one side of the issue
were those who argued that budget deficits were a symptom of fiscal
irresponsibility and that tax increases were the appropriate solution.
The other side, which was taken by many in the Reagan administra
tion, agreed that the growth in federal budget deficits was a symptom
of fiscal irresponsibility but argued that the appropriate solution was
to lower spending. 3
The latter view is consistent with the budget constraint hypothesis
discussed extensively by Milton Friedman.4 On the assumption that
there always exists a worthwhile program that someone wishes to
enact, the budget constraint model of government hypothesizes that
revenues determine spending levels. This follows from standard mi
croeconomic theory of the consumer: consumers operate with scarce
resources and thus are limited in the amount they can consume. The
limits of current consumption are determined by accumulated wealth,
current income, and the ability to borrow on future resources, which
together define the budget constraint. An expanded budget constraint
allows for expanded consumption opportunities.
The budget constraint hypothesis impli~s that the government,
like individual consumers, is subject to scarce resources. (Were it not,
we would have no difficulty removing poverty, hunger, homelessness,
and many other problems from our broad and growing list of policy
concerns.) The budget constraint facing government consists of the
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means by which expenditures are funded: tax receipts and debt. Taxes
are levied either directly through legislation or indirectly through infla
tion. The deficit is the residual between collected taxes and current
spending and determines new borrowing. Although only the central
government has the power to create money, the government's ability
to consume is constrained by the same factors that confront private
citizens.
The budget constraint analogy offers an organizing framework for
relevant policy questions. One obvious question concerns the expected
impact on government spending of a deficit reduction policy that in
cludes raising taxes. With the budget constraint approach, raising
taxes, by itself, serves to expand the spending opportunity set of gov
ernment. This is really nothing new: Friedman has often repeated his
famous maxim that "governments spend what governments receive
plus whatever they can get away with." s The relevant question, then,
becomes an empirical one: What does the evidence indicate about the
effect of past tax increases on government expenditures?
John Cogan presents an interesting variant of the budget con
straint model that focuses on the dependence of budgetary decisions
on the method of finance. 6 His argument is developed in two parts.
First, he likens the institutional arrangements in the congressional bud
get process to a common property resource. The common resource is
the general revenue fund. The problem is that when many congres
sional committees draw on the general revenues, no single committee
has an incentive to restrain its spending commitments. Even worse,
since no single committee has any residual claim to unspent general
funds, there is competition to outspend other committees. Consequent
ly expenditures financed from general fund revenues increase much
faster than the revenues themselves.
Second, he argues that the creation of tax-financed trust funds, the
first of which was social security, transferred spending authority from
the appropriations committees to the tax-writing committees and
thereby created a revenue bias in favor of trust fund taxes and against
general fund taxes. Since the tax-writing committees have exclusive
jurisdiction over trust fund expenditures (and taxes), it is easier for
them to capture the political benefits of spending on these programs. In
addition the proceeds of trust fund taxes (for example, the social se
curity payroll tax) are tied more closely than general fund revenues to
the interests of the tax-writing committees. This analytical framework
suggests a substitution of trust fund revenues for general fund rev
enues, with social security taxes funding a larger share of government
overtime.
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The opposing view to the budget constraint hypothesis argues that
politicians are not self-serving spenders (or tax substituters) but rather
are committed to living within their means. Here the possibility that
tax increases could fund additional spending rather than reduce the
deficit is either highly discounted or believed to be false as there is
assumed to be no innate proclivity among politicians to use higher
taxes to fund larger expenditures or new programs. This view there
fore implies either that there is no causal relation between increased
taxes and increased spending or that the true causal relation runs from
spending to taxes.
One's view of the budget constraint hypothesis greatly influences
policy recommendations regarding the social security surpluses. The
budget constraint hypothesis suggests that social security surpluses
will lead to increases (decreases)-within and outside of social se
curity-in federal spending (taxes). That is, since social security
surpluses are really excess social security revenues, and there is no
prohibition on the spending of these revenues, politicians will be in
clined to increase other spending programs or trim other taxes rather
than enjoy a lower federal budget deficit and national debt. If the
budget constraint view of political behavior is correct, today's excess
payroll taxes will not be saved for payouts of future social security
benefits but will promote the relaxation of the budget constraint facing
politicians.
The major alternative hypothesis is that political behavior in the
area of non-social-security spending and taxation is independent of
social security spending and taxation. That is, social security surpluses,
or excess taxes, will have no effect on the rest of the budget, leading
instead to a reduction in the overall federal 'deficit and the amount of
federal debt held by the public. This is the usual argument for running
surpluses in the first place, and it assumes that politicians resist all
temptations to spend the new resources at their command.
The Granger causality test is one way to test which hypothesis
regarding political decisions is correce Based on the predictability of a
variable over time, Granger causality attempts to determine whether
the forecasts of a variable Y, such as government spending, using both
past values of itself and that of another variable X, such as social
security surpluses, are better than forecasts based solely on lagged
values of Y. If so, then X is said to one-way cause Y. If it is found that X
causes Y and that Y causes X, then two-way causality exists between X
and Y. Finally, if one-way causality does not exist in either direction,
the fourth possibility exists: the variables bear no causal relation to one
another and are truly independent.
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Empirical Evidence of Tax-Spend Causality
The available empirical evidence generally supports the view that gov
ernment tax and spending decisions are causally related. Of the nine or
more studies that directly test for causality, the majority find evidence
of dependence between revenue and spending decisions. Neela Man
age and Michael L. Marlow tested for causality in federal finances over
the period 1929 to 1982.8 In seven of the twelve cases studied (or 58
percent) they found bidirectional causality; in the remaining cases (42
percent) they found one-way causality running from budget receipts to
budget outlays. This study concludes that even in the case of bidirec
tionality, one cannot reject the hypothesis that tax increases will be
associated with subsequent spending increases. Using a similar frame
work, Rati Ram offers additional support for these results. 9 David Joul
faian provides evidence of two-way, or simultaneous, causality
between federal taxes and spending. IO
Paul R. Blackley uses causality tests on the federal tax-spend rela
tion over the period 1929-1982.11 He concludes that while it is not
possible to reject the hypothesis that the 'tax-spend relationship is
simultaneous, revenue growth appears to bear a much stronger causal
link to spending growth than vice versa.
Marlow and Manage address the issue of whether the many dif
ferent legislative and constitutional constraints at the state and local
levels of government affect the causal relation between revenues and
expenditures.12 At the state level the evidence supports the budget
constraint hypothesis. At the local level the evidence suggests no caus
ality. Further testing of the same data by Abdur R. Chowdhry provides
evidence that supports the budget constraint hypothesis at the local
levelP Evidence of similar causality at the local level is also found by
Douglas Holtz-Eakin. 14
To date, only two studies do not support the budget constraint
hypothesis. William Anderson, Myles S. Wallace, and John T. Warner
find one-way causality running from real federal spending to real fed
eral tax revenues. IS In a study of quarterly federal tax and spending
data, George M. von Furstenburg, Jeffrey R. Green, and Jin-Ho Jeogn
find no significant relationship between spending and taxes. 16 Bud
getary decisions, however, are made on an annual basis, so the use of
quarterly data introduces many potential trouble spots concerning rev
enue and expenditure flows that have little, or possibly nothing, to do
with annual political budgetary decisions. 17
In sum, while the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed, most
studies indicate one-way causality running from taxes to spending and
therefore yield strong support for the budget constraint hypothesis.
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Only one study shows causality in the other direction. The possibility
that causality is complex, or bidirectional, should not be dismissed,
however. While the budget constraint hypothesis appears to be at least
partially correct, the alternative hypothesis may contain some validity
as well.l 8 The advantage of causality testing is that it does not impose
any assumptions on behavior or causality; rather it tests for causal
relations. This empirical approach allows both proponents and skep
tics of the budget constraint hypothesis their day in court.
The important similarity between the federal tax and spending
relation and the relation between social security and the federal budget
is the existence of political discretion. Both relationships are uncon
strained by rules. Therefore one cannot make a priori assumptions that
are known to be correct about how a surplus of social security funds
will be used. This chapter attempts to shed light on how politicians are
likely to respond to social security's looming surpluses.
Empirical Tests. The data used in the causality tests are drawn from
the 1989 U.S. budget. For the period 1940 to 1987, data are used for total
(on- and off-budget) federal revenues and expenditures, and on social
security revenues, expenditures, and reserves. 19 Social security is de
fined to include all four programs or trust funds: Old-Age and Sur
vivors Insurance, Disability Insurance, Hospital Insurance, and Sup
plemental Medical Insurance. The reserve in any particular year is
equal to the accumulated assets of the four trust funds as of the end of
the fiscal year. These data are used to compute non-social-security
expenditures (revenues), which are simply aggregate federal spending
(revenues) less social security spending (revenues). The annual surplus
or deficit in social security, referred to as the trust fund balance, is
computed from the one-year change in trust fund reserves. The trust
fund balances (rather than reserves) are emphasized here because they
closely indicate, at the margin, the potential for changes in political
discretionary spending opportunities.
Three technical issues should be considered before evaluating the
empirical estimations. First, there are serial correlation problems in
data on levels, such as annual federal expenditures, that must be cor
rected before using the Granger test. (The Granger test requires that
each time series be stationary. The relationship between any two obser
vations depends only on the time interval between them and not on
time itself; most time series of level data contain some type of trend.)
To handle this problem, the data were first-differenced: the value of the
previous observation was subtracted from each observation. All the
data were then transformed into annual growth rates, with additional
first-differences taken until the time trend was eliminated. 20 The data
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TABLE 6-1
TRIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUES,
FEDERAL SPENDING, AND SOCIAL SECURITY BALANCES

Hypothesis
FS = f(FS, SR)
(SB causesFS)
Lag

SR = f (SR, FS)
(SB causes SR)

SB = f(SB,FS)
(SR causes SB)

F

1:SB

F

1:SB

F

1:SR

1

0.96

1.85

4.01"

3

4.93b

4

2.13c

5

3.23a

0.11
1.36
-0.41
1.51
-l.01a
2.07
-1.00
1.29
-1.49
1.24

1.14

2

0.15
0.98
-LIsa
2.12
-2.13a
2.43
-2.63a
2.10
-3.03c
1.98

-0.13
1.07
-0.25
1.17
-0040
1.10
-0.45
0.78
-0.72
0.83

FS = f (FS, SB)
(SR causes FS)
1:SR

F
1

2.83c

2

3.79a

3

5.38b

4

4.90b

5

4.46b

0.47c
1.68
1.33a
2.41
2.22c
2.80
3.37b
3.24
2.39c
1.72

FS=f(FS)
(SR&SB cause FS)
1
2
3
4
5

1.64
2.37c
1.36
1.28

SR = f (SR, SB)
(FS causes SR)

3.71 a
0.93
0.30
0.45

SB = f(SB, SR)
(FS causes SB)

F

:EFS

F

0.01

-om

0.17

0.09
0.15
1.65
0.18
1.39
0.12
0.61
0.25
0.75

1048
2.98a
1.99
1.58

SR = f(SR)
(FS&SB cause SR)

lAO

0.73
0.25
0.19

SB = f(SB)
(FS&SR cause SB)

F

F

F

3.21 c
3.13a
4.28b
2.74 a
3.18b

1.03
1.46
2.31 c
1.67
1.58

0.73
2.19c
0.61
0.27
0.30

SR = social security revenues
FS = total federal spending
SB = social security trust fund balances
a. Significant at the .05 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:).
b. Significant at the .01 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:).
c. Significant at the .10 level (absolute value of t-statistic below 1:).
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0.59
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0.11
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on trust fund reserves required third-differencing; all other data re
quired second-differencing.
The transformed data can be interpreted as follows. Social security
revenues, non-social-security revenues, total federal expenditures, and
non-social-security expenditures are measured as changes in annual
growth rates. Since the first-difference of social security trust fund
reserves is the current period's trust fund balance (surplus or deficit),
the second-difference is the growth rate of the trust fund balance and
the third-difference is the change in the growth rate of the trust fund
balance. Therefore, causality tests will identify the causal relationships
between changes in the growth rate of social security revenues, trust
fund balances, and federal spending.
Second, there are differing views regarding the appropriate lag
length to use in a causality test. Symmetric lags, ranging from one to
five years, were used here. 21
Third, two statistics of interest in this application of Granger caus
ality tests are provided. One is the F-statistic, which is used to test the
null hypothesis that all coefficients on the independent variables are
zero. 22 Failure to reject the null hypothesis indicates that at least some
subset of independent variables exerts a statistically significant effect
on the dependent variable. The other statistic is the sum of the coeffi
cients (I,).23 A t-test on the sum of the coefficients indicates whether the
causal effects on the dependent variable are permanent or transitory in
nature and in what direction as evidenced by the sign on the sum of
coefficients.
Table 6-1 presents the results of a trivariate causality test between
total federal spending (FS), social security revenues (SR), and trust
fund balances (SB). Since there are three variables of interest, a tri
variate causality approach is used here to understand how their past
values are related to one another. Three causal orderings are possible:
one or more variables one-way cause one or more variables, all vari
ables experience tridirectional causality (that is, they are simultaneous
ly related), or none of the variables are causally related to another.
The F-scores displayed in the first column are associated with the
null hypothesis that social security revenues or trust fund balances are
significantly related to aggregate federal spending. The number 0.96,
for example, in the first column and first row is the F-score associated
with the hypothesis that SB is significantly related to FS. It is obtained
by comparing the sum of squared residuals ,(SSRs) of the two equa
tions: FS = f(FS, SR, SB) and FS = f(FS, SR). The displayed F-score is
obtained from the usual calculation that determines whether the
change in SSRs is statistically different from zero. If the F-score exceeds
the appropriate F-statistic, then SB is significantly related to FS. The
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F-scores in the middle of the first column refer to the comparison
between FS =!(FS, SR, SB) and FS =!(FS, SB); it is associated with the
null hypothesis that SR is not statistically related to FS.
Next to the F-scores are the sums of coefficients (2,) relating to the
previous test of significance. As mentioned, the F-test is appropriate for
testing whether all independent variables exert statistically significant
effects on a dependent variable. The t-test on the sum of coefficients is
appropriate for testing whether the independent variable exerts a per
manent effect. The sum of coefficients is displayed along with its as
sociated t-score below it. If the t-score exceeds its critical level, then the
independent variable exerts a permanent effect on the dependent vari
able. Failure to exceed its critical level indicates that any effects are
transitory in nature.
The results indicate that neither social security revenues nor trust
fund balances are significantly explained by past values of any three o!
the variables. That is, with the equation of SR as the dependent vari
able, the F-scores associated with the influence of past values of FS and
SB are generally not statistically different from zero. The only excep
tions occur when three-year lags are used; even here, though, the F
scores are only marginally significant at the 10 percent level for the
tests involving SB by itself and FS and SB together. Moreover, the only
permanent effect from SB on SR is when it is by itself with the three
year lag specification; in this case it is a negative effect implying that
past increases in SB have exerted an inverse influence on SR. When SB
is the dependent variable, SR exerts a negative effect only with the
two-year lag specification; the effect, however, is not permanent.
The equations with aggregate federal spending as the dependent
variable indicate that both social security revenues and trust fund bal
ances exert significant influences. Moreover, in most cases those effects
are permanent. The results indicate that while past increases in SB
exert negative effects on FS, past increases in SR exert positive effects.
That is, the positive permanent coefficient on SR is empirical support
for the tax-and-spend hypothesis. Here it is interpreted as indicating
that past increases in social security revenues have exerted positive
effects on total federal spending. In addition the permanent negative
coefficient on SB indicates that past increases in trust fund balances
have exerted inverse effects on total federal spending.
The implications for causality are as follows. There appears to be
little evidence that social security revenues and trust fund balances are
related to (or cause) past changes in themselves or to past changes in
total federal spending. Past changes in social security revenues and
trust fund balances, however, explain (or cause) significant movements
in aggregate federal spending. The evidence thus suggests that over the
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period examined, causation runs from social security revenues and
trust fund balances to aggregate federal spending. That is, past move
ments in trust fund balances and revenues explain current aggregate
federal spending and not vice versa. Therefore tax and spending de
. cisions are causal in nature, with changes in social security revenues
and trust fund balances leading to (causing) changes in federal spend
ing.
Table 6-2 is similar to table 6-1 except that total federal spending
is disaggregated into its social security and non-social-security com
ponents. This allows an additional test within the causality framework.
Comparison of tables 6-1 and 6-2 indicates that as before, past move
ments in social security revenues and trust fund balances have led to,
or caused, non-social-security spending. Moreover, past increases in
social security revenues have caused increases in non-social-security
spending.
Additional Tests of Causality
While there is support for the budget constraint hypothesis in the case
of the prospending effects of past increases in social security revenues,
there is also evidence that past changes in the growth of trust fund
balances have exerted negative and statistically significant effects on
federal spending. One possible explanation for this latter result is that
surplus monies in the trust funds are actually being saved, thus reduc
ing the amount that the federal government must borrow and the
amount of spending that is needed to service the government's debt.
This explanation, however, conflicts with the above empirical support
for the budget constraint hypothesis regarding past social security
revenues and federal spending. In addition it conflicts with the finding
that trust fund surpluses are not causally related to social security
revenues or federal spending. Therefore the evidence in support of the
argument that excess social security trust fund balances are saved and
not spent is weak or nonexistent.
The results reported in tables 6-1 and 6-2 also indicate that neither
federal spending nor trust fund balances are causally related to social
security revenues. As such, the empirical relationship between trust
fund balances and federal spending does not appear to be related in
any causal fashion to increased social security revenues. Rather the
relationship appears to be associated with the other determinant of
trust fund balances: social security spending.
Table 6-3 contains the results of various bivariate causality tests
that seek to determine why there exists an inverse causal relationship
running from social security trust fund balances to federal spending.
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TABLE

6-2

TRIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS BETWEEN SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUES,
NON-SOCIAL-SECURITY SPENDING, AND SOCIAL SECURITY BALANCES

Hypothesis

NFS == !(FS, SR)
(SB causes NFS)

Lag
1
2
3
4
5

1
2
3
4
5

1
2
3
4
5

F

I.SB

SR == ! (SR, NFS)
(SB causes SR)
F

I.SB

SB ==! (SB, NFS)
(SR causes SB)

F

I.SR

0.82

0.14
0.91
-1.18a
3.87a
2.12
-2.09a
4.82b
2.32
2.09
-2.64a
2.08
-1.98 a
3.22a
3.13
NFS == ! (FS, SB)
(SR causes NFS)

1.82

0.11
1.35
-0.42
1.66
1.53
-1.02a
2.34c
2.08
-1.04
1.34
1.35
-1.61
1.30
1.34
SR == ! (SR, SB)
(NFS causes SR)

-0.13
1.07
-0.25
3.74a
1.15
0.90
-0.38
1.05
0.31
-0.45
0.77
0.46
-0.81
0.69
SB =!(SB, SR)
(NFS causes SB)

F
3.47b

F
0.03

F
0.28

1.14

I.SR
0.52c
1.86
4.14a
1.37a
2.44
2.35b
5.68 b
2.91
3.96b
5.06b
3.25
2.49c
4.44b
1.74
NFS==!(NFS)
(SR&SB cause NFS)

I.NFS
-0.01
0.02
1.42
0.14
1.60
0.18
2.83 c
1.39
1.90
0.12
0.60
1.51
0.24
0.73
SR == !(SR)
(NFS&SB cause SR)

I.NFS
-0.33
0.53
0.05
1.37
0.71
0.65
0.10
0.98
0.27
0.05
0.32
0.07
0.21
0.27
SB == !(SB)
(NFS&SR cause SB)

F
3.52a
3.26a
4.40b
2.86 a
3.32b

F
1.04
1.43
2.23c
1.62
1.54

F
0.79
2.17c
0.56
0.28
0.32

SR == social security revenues
NFS == net federal spending (total federal spending minus social security spend
ing)
SB == social security trust fund balances
a. Significant at the .05 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.).
b. Significant at the .01 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.).
c. Significant at the .10 level (absolute value of t-statistic below I.).
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TABLE 6-3
BIVARIATE CAUSALITY TESTS OF ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis
5B causes 55

Lag
2
3
4
5

2
3
4
5

2
3
4
5

2
3
4
5

2
3
4
5

F

55 causes 5B
F

6.57a
6.29 a
1.89
0.98

0.49
0.20
0.38
0.23

5B causesNI

NI causes 5B

F
0.21
0.34
0.16
2.19b

F
1.55
1.35
2.61 b
1.87

5B causes NNI

NNI causes 5B

F
0.23
1.16
1.87
0.55

6.88 a
2.33b
1.40
1.63

5B causes OEF

OEF causes 5B

F
0.01
0.38
0.68
0.74

F
0.19
1.60
1.09
1.07

5B causes NOEF

NOEF causes 5B

F
0.03
0.30
0.75
0.73

F
0.52
1.39
1.01
0.88

F

5B = social security trust fund balances
NI = net interest,(on- and off-budget) of u.s. government
NNI = NI - intragovernmental interest receipts of social security trust funds
OEF = federal budget deficit (on- and off-budget)
NOEF = OEF - intragovernmental interest receipts of social security trust funds
55 = social security outlays
a. Significant at the .01 level.
b. Significant at the .10 level.

131

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE BUDGET

The first set of causality tests are between the trust fund balances (5B)
and social security spending (55). After second-differencing the data
on spending, there is evidence of a permanent inverse one-way causal
relationship running from the trust fund balances to social security
spending for the first two lag configurations. In other words the nega
tive effect of the trust fund balances on federal spending appears to be
related in part to their influence on social security spending.
While this may appear to run counter to the budget constraint
hypothesis, the inverse relationship between federal spending and
trust fund balances may be spurious, stemming from a mechanical
problem that is unrelated to political behavior.24 When an independent
variable is jointly determined, as is clearly the case with trust fund
balances, its coefficient can be difficult to interpret.
This problem does not arise in the causality tests using non-social
security spending, so one might argue that the evidence indicates that
the budget constraint theory of political behavior is not supported by
the past relationship between trust fund balances and non-social-se
curity federal spending. This possibility deserves further testing since,
if it is valid, it may place in doubt the earlier result concerning the
positive one-way causal relationship running from social security rev
enues to federal spending.
To submit the data to further scrutiny, the counter hypothesis
that trust fund surpluses reduce interest payments to the public by
reducing the amount of outstanding debt-is tested. Stated another
way, past social security surpluses have not relaxed fiscal restraint in
the rest of the budget. To test this, a bivariate causality test is per
formed between the net interest payments (on- and off-budget) of the
U.S. government (ND and the trust fund balances (5B).25 The results are
reported in table 6-3. After first-differencing the data on net interest,
there is no permanent causal relationship between the two variables,
suggesting that this hypothesis does not appear to have any empirical
basis. As an additional test of the same hypothesis, net interest less
interest receipts of the social security trust funds (NND was also con
sidered. Mter first-differencing this data, the results of the causality
test did not change. Social security trust fund balances bear no causal
relationship to this adjusted measure of net interest.
Finally, the counter hypothesis-that social security surpluses
cause, or lead to, federal government savings-is tested. Rather than a
look at the effect of trust fund balances on the interest payment portion
of the federal budget, their effect on the overall budget deficit is direct
ly examined.
Two measures of the total (on- and off-budget) federal deficit are
considered: DEF and NDEF. DEF is simply the difference between total
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federal spending and total federal revenues. 26 NDEF is defined as DEF
less the interest receipts of the trust funds. After first-differencing both
measures of federal deficits, the results in table 6-3 indicate that there
exists no causal relationship between social security trust fund balan
ces and either measure of the federal budget deficit. Therefore, the past
relationship between these variables appears to be one of indepen
dence. This finding is not supportive of the counterhypothesis that the
social security surpluses are saved.
Summary of the Empirical Evidence
The evidence in tables 6-1 and 6-2 provides support for the budget
constraint hypothesis that past increases in social security revenues
have led to an increase in federal spending. The evidence also indicates
that there has been a historical one-way inverse causal relationship
running from social security trust fund balances to federal spending.
While the latter may appear inconsistent with the budget constraint
hypothesis, however, it may stem from an empirical problem of includ
ing social security balances and social security spending in the same
equation. Moreover, while some may wish to suggest that this inverse
causal relation serves to invalidate the budget constraint hypothesis,
the empirical evidence in table 6-3 does not contain any verification of
the usual counterarguments to the budget constraint hypothesis. Spe
cifically there is no evidence to support the view that social security
surpluses lead to lower federal spending, interest payments, or
deficits. 27
Conclusions
The primary purpose of this chapter is to determine whether there
should be concern that the projected surpluses of the social security
trust funds might be spent rather than saved. Since there exist no
written, or binding, constraints on the behavior of politicians concern
ing this issue, the answer to this important question cannot be
projected with great certainty. At best, predictions can be based on the
assumption that past political behavior is a good guide to the future,
and to do so, causality tests between the primary policy variables can
be employed.
The empirical evidence provides support for the budget constraint
theory of political behavior: increased revenues will be treated as a
general loosening of the budget constraint facing politicians. In periods
when social security revenues have grown, there is a causal link to
expansions in federal spending-both aggregate federal spending and
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non-social-security spending. This suggests that the decision to raise
revenues in the 1983 Social Security Amendments will lead to an ex
pansion in federal spending.
There is also evidence that both social security taxes and non-so
cial-security taxes fund non-social-security programs. While taxpayers
may operate on the assumption that social security taxes fund only
social security spending, 'it appears that "a tax is a tax," when it comes
to the tendency to expand government spending.
Notwithstanding the attempt to make predictions based on actual
historical relations, there remains great uncertainty over future politi
cal behavior. This is merely a restatement of the fact that political
decisions involving the use of social security surpluses are not subject
to binding constraints. Given the importance that many place on social
security, the replacement of political discretion with rules of conduct is
suggested for the future relationships between social security taxes,
trust fund balances, and aggregate federal spending and taxation. Ab
sent such rules, guesses will continue about the future relationships
between these important policy variables.
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